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TOWARD GENDER-NEUTRAL DATA FOR ADJUDICATING
LOST FUTURE EARNING DAMAGES: AN
EVIDENTIARY PERSPECTIVE
INTRODUCTION
The damages phase of civil litigation involves quantifying the loss
for which the defendant has been found liable, or, in other words, put-
ting a dollar value on that which has been lost.' Of the numerous
types of damages to be quantified in court, redress for lost earning
capacity2 remains one of the most difficult to measure, and it raises
profound social justice issues. 3 By looking at the particular circum-
stances of a plaintiff's situation, an equitable determination of loss of
future earning capacity can be made.4 Acute problems arise, how-
ever, when the courts must grapple with injuries to children, women,
homemakers, and other individuals who are voluntarily absent from
the waged workforce. 5 In these situations, there is no earning pattern
on which to base an individualized determination of lost future earn-
ing potential. This Note will focus on those cases where there is ab-
sent or insufficient work history that would help determine future
earnings. When such individualized determinations are not possible,
the Note argues that courts and experts should rely on gender-neutral
statistical data.6
1. See Frederick T. Davis, Use of Expert Witnesses in Proving Damages, in LrmATION, at
279, 279 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 345, 1988).
2. Recovery of damages for loss of earning capacity is not merely a recovery for lost
wages. Damages should be estimated by the injured person's ability to earn money, rather than
what he actually earned before the injury. See 25 C.J.S. Damages § 40, at 724-26 (1966 & Supp.
1995). Lost earning capacity can be summarized as follows:
Where the injury is a lasting one, which will cause a loss or lessening of future earning
power, a recovery may be had for the probable loss of future earnings. In estimating
this, account must be taken of the probable length of plaintiffs life, as indicated by his
age, health, and occupation, and the mortality tables, while not controlling, may be
considered. The full amount of future earnings which are prevented by the injury can-
not be awarded, but only their present worth; the annuity tables may be used, but the
jury must be instructed to make allowances for the diminution of wages which advanc-
ing years would have brought apart from the injury.
C. McCoRMICK, DAMAGES 299 (1st ed. 23d prtg. 1985). Although technically incorrect, this
element of damages is sometimes referred to as lost future earnings. See Evelyn Esther Zabel, A
Plain English Approach to Loss of Future Earning Capacity, 24 WASHBURN L.J. 253, 254 n.10
(1985).
3. See Jamie Cassels, Damages for Lost Earning Capacity: Women and Children Lastl, 71
CANADIAN B. REV. 445, 445 (1992).
4. See Martha Chamallas, Questioning the Use of Race-Specific and Gender-Specific Data
in Tort Litigation: A Constitutional Argument, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 73, 76 (1994).
5. See Cassels, supra note 3, at 445.
6. The courts have already held that the use of gender-based actuarial tables constitutes
prohibited discrimination in the assessment of automobile insurance rates, see Hartford Acci-
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Resorting to gender-specific data can potentially have enormous
consequences for plaintiffs in tort actions. In 1990, for example, Pro-
fessor Richard Stevenson of the University of Iowa's College of Busi-
ness Administration calculated the projected lifetime income
(discounted to present value) of a female college graduate at
$1,174,772, compared to a male college graduate's projected income
of $1,815,850. 7 The use of such gender classifications means that if a
man and a woman with the same educational prospects were perma-
nently disabled, the woman's award would be only sixty-five percent
of the man's, a disparity attributable solely to the plaintiff's gender. 8
The basic strategy for calculating lost future earning capacity is to
compare the amount the plaintiff was capable of earning before the
injury to the amount the plaintiff is or was capable of earning after the
injury.9 Generally, the authorities agree that this element of damages
is intended to compensate for loss of potential.10 By focusing on what
the plaintiff could have earned, rather than what the plaintiff would
have earned, the courts developed a theory that authorizes awards for
persons who perform unpaid labor in the home or whose work is not
dent & Indem. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r of Pa., 482 A.2d 542, 549 (Pa. 1984); rates of contribu-
tion to or benefit amounts of pensions, see City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711
(1978); and annuities, see Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 691 F.2d 1054, 1062 (2d Cir.
1982), vacated on other grounds, 463 U.S. 1223 (1983), on remand, 735 F.2d 23 (1984).
It should be noted that the use of gender-neutral tables may have a detrimental effect on
damage awards received by a male plaintiff. If the data on average income for women and men
(in a particular educational attainment category or occupational field) were combined, the aver-
age income figure would be lower than that of men only. To prevent this decrease, the table
could be based on the average male income, thus reflecting what value society places on particu-
lar skills. Those figures would then be applied to both men and women. In sum, women's future
earning potential would be valued the same as men's (at least when the man and woman were
similarly situated).
7. See Chamallas, supra note 4, at 83-84.
8. See id. at 84. Professor Stevenson had extensive experience as an expert witness on
damages. See id. Coincidentally, this 65% rate is roughly the same percentage of men's income
that women receive for the same work. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTIcS, U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, BULLETIN No. 2385, WORKING WOMEN: A CHARTBOOK 21-22, 44 (1991) [hereinafter
WORKINo WOMEN C-ARTBOOK].
9. See Chamallas, supra note 4, at 79.
10. See id.; see also 25 C.J.S. Damages § 40, at 724-26 (1966 & Supp. 1995). Damages should
be estimated by the injured person's ability to earn money, rather than what he actually earned
before the injury. See id. at § 87, at 952-54; see., e.g., Gordon v. Yellow Cab Co. 100 Pa. Super.
558, 561 (1930) (stating that the standard of compensation is not loss of wages, but deprivation
or diminution of earning capacity); see also Southern Coach Lines v. Wilson, 214 S.W.2d 55, 56
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1948), which states that:
It is true this distinction is often not observed. Indeed, it is of no practical importance
in some cases. For instance, in a case where the plaintiff was earning and, if he had
continued to earn at the same rate during the period of his incapacity, his loss in earn-
ings furnishes practically an accurate measure of his loss in earning capacity. But in




otherwise compensated in the market." The common starting point
for calculating loss of earning capacity is the plaintiff's established
earnings record. 2 When the plaintiff does not have an earnings rec-
ord, or has only a very limited earnings record, it is necessary to turn
to statistical data to determine the level of earnings the plaintiff could
have achieved. 1
3
Courts, expert witnesses, and lawyers have relied on statistical
data divided into gender classifications to calculate loss of earning ca-
pacity14 under the assumption that the more factors one uses, the
more specific and accurate the damage calculation.' 5 The use of such
statistical data, however, perpetuates the disparities between men and
women in the distribution of personal income. 16 Despite federal stat-
utes prohibiting discrimination in pay on the basis of sex,17 data indi-
cate that women workers earn less per year than men, even though
they are employed in the same occupation.' 8 Thus, the economic
11. See Chamallas, supra note 4, at 79.
12. See id. at 80.
13. See 8 PAUL M. DEUTSCH & FREDERICK A. RAFFA, DAMAGES IN TORT AcrIONS
§ 110.11[2], at 110-8 (1990).
14. See Chamallas, supra note 4, at 75.
15. See Leo M. O'Connor & Robert E. Miller, The Economist-Statistician: A Source of Ex-
pert Guidance in Determining Damages, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 354, 356 (1972).
16. See Chamallas, supra note 4, at 85-89; see infra notes 108-16 and accompanying text. It
should be noted that men are harmed by gender-specific tables when their wives are killed since
they do not receive full compensation for the loss of their wives' services.
17. See Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1994), which provides in pertinent part:
No [subject] employer.., shall discriminate... between employees on the basis of sex
by paying wages to employees.., at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to
employees of the opposite sex ... for equal work on jobs the performance of which
requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar
working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority
system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or qual-
ity of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex.
See also Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1996), which makes it unlawful for
an employer "to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin."
In addition to the Civil Rights Act and the Equal Pay Act, there are several important
principles that affect female employment that have been set forth by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). In March 1972, the EEOC issued its report entitled
"Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex." In these guidelines, the EEOC states that em-
ployers may not refuse to hire a woman because they believe women have higher job turnover
rates than men; they cannot refuse to hire women because of an assumption that women as a
group are less capable of doing certain tasks than men; and they cannot cite the preferences of
customers or of coworkers as a consideration for excluding women. The guidelines also include
clarifications regarding such issues as the treatment of married women, pre-employment inquir-
ies about family plans, and coverage of existing fringe benefit programs or disability coverages.
See F. RAY MARSHALL ET AL., LABOR ECONOMICS: WAGES, EMPLOYMENT, AND TRADE UNION-
ISM 530 (4th ed. 1980).




value of women is often considered to be less than that of men when
determining damages in personal injury and wrongful death cases. 19
The use of gender-based tables assumes that the current pay gap be-
tween men and women will continue in the future, "despite ongoing
legal and institutional efforts to make the workplace more diverse and
less discriminatory. '20 This practice magnifies the impact of employ-
ment discrimination 2' and devalues the earning capacity of injured
women, resulting in widely varying damage awards of equally situated
men and women for the same injury. 22
Part I of this Note examines data on gender bias in lost future
earning awards,23 including statistics showing the difference between
damages awarded to female plaintiffs and those awarded to male
plaintiffs, as well as jury studies used in determining what factors
cause this differential. This Section also examines the gender differ-
ences in the factors themselves which are used to calculate lost future
earning capacity. Finally, this Section reviews cases that refer to gen-
der when discussing the calculation of lost future earnings. Part II
examines the current method of introducing evidence of lost future
earnings at trial and the corresponding application of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.24 Part III of this Note recommends an alternative,
gender-neutral method for determining lost future earning damages
while remaining consistent with the Federal Rules of Evidence.25
I. GENDER BIAS IN LOST FUTURE EARNING AWARDS
A. Empirical Studies on Size of Damage Awards
The available empirical data confirms that awards received by
women tend to be smaller than those received by men and that the
disparity is probably traceable, in part, to lower awards for lost future
earning capacity.26 Future earnings damages were one of many sub-
jects reviewed by task forces assembled to study gender bias in the
courts. By 1994, such task forces had been formed in at least thirty-
19. See WASHINGTON STATE TASK FORCE ON GENDER AND JUSTICE IN THE COURTS, RE-
PORT 88 (1989) [hereinafter WASHINGTON REPORT ON GENDER].
20. Chamallas, supra note 4, at 75.
21. See id.
22. See infra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
23. See discussion infra Part I.
24. See discussion infra Part II.
25. See discussion infra Part III.
26. See ILLINOIS TASK FORCE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS, THE 1990 REPORT 177
[hereinafter ILLINOIS REPORT]; ELIZABETH M. KING & JAMES P. SMITH, ECONOMIC LOSS AND
COMPENSATION IN AVIATION ACCIDENTS 45 (1988); Chamallas, supra note 4, at 84-85.
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eight state court jurisdictions,27 and twenty-eight had issued reports.28
For example, the Washington State Task Force on Gender and Justice
in the Courts studied wrongful death cases between 1984 and 1988 and
found that the mean damage award for male decedents was $332,166,
while the mean award for female decedents was $214,923.29 The au-
thors of the report hypothesized that a "significant factor" producing
the disparity was the real difference in the earnings of men and wo-
men and the assessment of lower worklife expectancy for women, be-
cause of women's lower rates of participation in the labor force.
30
The disparities in awards found in the Washington Report on
Gender have also been found in other state task force studies. The
report from the Illinois Task Force on Gender Bias expressed con-
cerns about reliance on generalizations regarding women's economic
potential. 31 According to the Illinois Report, jurors often assume that
women's labor force participation will be less than men's either be-
cause women will take substantial time out of the labor force to give
birth and care for children or because they will work fewer hours per
year than men.32 The report expressed the view that such assumptions
might prevent jurors from judging the plaintiff as an individual based
"on the facts of her particular case, unfiltered through historical or
societal biases."' 33 The report also faulted the use of statistics based
on past experience to predict future patterns:34 Statistical models for
predicting women's work habits "fail to capture the rapid, sustained
increases in women's labor-force participation, and they underesti-
mate future labor-force participation, especially for younger wo-
men."'35 If assessments of female plaintiffs' future earning capacity
"are based upon static assumptions drawn from past employment pat-
terns" that, in fact, are rapidly changing, "damage awards may be un-
fair not only to the individual plaintiff but also to younger women as a
class." 36
27. See Vicki C. Jackson, Empiricism, Gender, and Legal Pedagogy: An Experiment in a
Federal Courts Seminar at Georgetown University Law Center, 83 GEo. L.J. 461, 462 n.5 (1994).
28. See id.
29. See WASHINGTON REPORT ON GENDER, supra note 19, at 89-90.
30. See id. at 87.
31. See ILUNois REPORT, supra note 26, at 186.
32. See id. at 187.
33. Id. at 189-90.
34. See id. at 190.
35. Id. (quoting KINo & SMrri, supra note 26, at 14).
36. Id.; see also discussion infra note 83 (describing that a fifty-year historical period is used
in determining employment patterns).
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In addition to the various state studies, a nationwide study by
Jury Verdict Research, Inc. examined jury awards in personal injury
cases. The results showed that women in all age groups except two
(age groups sixty to sixty-four and over eighty) received significantly
lower mean and median awards for compensatory damages than did
men.37 For ages twenty to twenty-nine, women received an average
award of $76,117, compared to $236,869 for men in the same group.
38
Furthermore, a study by the Rand Corporation of damage awards
in air crash cases found "strong, consistent differences in loss and
compensation by sex."'39 The authors concluded that the disparity in
awards results largely from "differences between the sexes in income,
work-life expectancy, and salary growth. ' 40 Another Rand Corpora-
tion study, this one of Cook County civil jury verdicts, is consistent
with these findings. With respect to the sex of the plaintiff, the au-
thors concluded that "plaintiffs who were male, worked at skilled,
blue collar jobs, and who were between 40 and 59 years of age re-
ceived larger awards than other plaintiffs" primarily because they had
larger lost income claims.
41
Jane Goodman, Elizabeth Loftus, Marian Miller, and Edith
Greene have also studied the effects of gender bias and stereotypes on
wrongful death damages.4 2 After reviewing past research on gender
bias in civil jury awards of monetary damages and analyzing data from
the Washington State Task Force on the Economic Consequences of
Gender in Civil Litigation Study, the authors generated their own data
by conducting a simulated wrongful death jury study.43 In addition to
jury verdict amounts, Goodman and her colleagues collected written
37. See 5 Jury Verdict Research, Inc., Personal Injury Valuation Handbooks: The Aged as
Plaintiffs pts. I & 11 (1987), cited in ILLINOIS REPORT, supra note 26, at 181.
38. ILLINOIS REPORT, supra note 26, at 180-81.
39. Kmio & SMrrH, supra note 26, at ix.
40. Id.
41. A. CHiN & M. PETERSON, DEEP POCKETS, EMPTY PocKETs: WHO WiNs rN COOK
CoUNr JURY TRIALS 44 (1985). The authors note, however, that the difference in verdicts also
was the result of the more severe injuries received by male workers in the blue-collar occupa-
tional group. On average, sales, clerical, and service workers (fields heavily populated by wo-
men) received the smallest awards. See id. at 29.
42. See Jane Goodman et al., Money, Sex, and Death. Gender Bias in Wrongful Death Dam-
age Awards, 25 LAW & Soc'y REV. 263 (1991).
43. The study used simulated wrongful death cases presented to potential jurors on call at
the King County Superior Courthouse. See id. at 270. To maximize the proportion of damage
awards, the jurors were informed that liability was undisputed. See id. For simplification, the
jurors were told that the decedent had experienced no pain and suffering. See id. Jurors then
reviewed one of three written case summaries (product liability, automobile negligence, and
medical malpractice) describing the wrongful death of a man or woman, survived by his or her
spouse. See id. In each case, the decedent was thirty years old, and self-employed with an an-
nual income of $25,000. See id.
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statements from sample jurors explaining how they determined an ap-
propriate sum of damages."4 The research revealed that a "double
standard" persists in jury awards for wrongful death depending upon
the sex of the decedent. 45 The authors concluded that "it can be
traced most directly to stereotypes about employment remuneration,
based on longstanding discrimination against women in the work-
place" and to "strong stereotypes about male and female roles in the
home. "46
Although it is difficult to determine whether a particular award in
a particular case is biased, the literature and empirical studies reveal
that gender-based attitudes and stereotypes are inherent in the calcu-
lation of damages by both economists and jurors. Specifically, actual
and perceived differences in wages, based upon past discrimination
against women, appear to be the primary reasons for the differential
in damage awards.
B. Gender Differences Inherent in the Factors Used in
Calculating Damages
The economist-statistician, when calculating damage estimations,
takes into consideration assumptions regarding the economic poten-
tial of women when he or she relies on data specific to woman.47 This
data is then presented to the jury in the form of expert opinion. 48 Fact
finders display gender bias when they conclude that such assumptions
are true in a particular case and award a woman less for future income
than they would award a similarly situated man with the same
injuries.49
In determining a plaintiff's future earning capacity, several fac-
tors must be taken into consideration. The expert must look at such
factors as the plaintiff's remaining life expectancy; his or her remain-
ing work life expectancy; the trend or expectancy of future earnings;
and the effect of factors such as inflation, economic growth, and in-
The damages awarded in the hypothetical cases were similar to those awarded in actual
cases. See id. The median award for male decedents was $750,036. See id. The median award
for female decedents was $251,607. See id. The difference in awards by gender of the decedent
existed for all three case types. See id.
44. See id. at 271-72, 276, 278-80.
45. See id. at 281.
46. Id. at 281-82.
47. When using such tables, the economist assumes that the woman is only capable of earn-
ing the average of women in the past.
48. See O'Connor & Miller, supra note 15, at 355.
49. See ILuNois REPORT, supra note 26, at 189.
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come taxes.50 After arriving at a prediction of lost earning capacity
for the remainder of the plaintiff's worklife expectancy, the expert
must then discount the amount to its present value because the plain-
tiff will receive lump sum payments. 51
As a practical matter, the most common starting point for calcu-
lating the lost earning capacity of adults is the plaintiff's established
earnings record.52 Current earnings are then used as the basis for pro-
jecting future earnings levels.5 3 The predicted future earnings are cal-
culated for the remainder of the plaintiff's worklife expectancy.
5 4
Where the plaintiff does not have an established earnings record, the
economist must turn to statistical tables to determine the average
earnings of persons with similar characteristics as the plaintiff, such as
educational attainment. 55
In calculating the worklife expectancy of plaintiffs, even for plain-
tiffs with an established work history, economists often rely upon gen-
der-specific worklife tables, which predict that women will spend
fewer years in the labor force.5 6 Worklife expectancy and life expec-
tancy are separate inquiries. 57 Worklife expectancy is calculated from
the working experience of all persons in the plaintiff's gender group.
58
The worklife tables provide an average for the group, reflecting the
historical pattern of actual years worked, incorporating rates of unem-
ployment, both voluntary and involuntary, as well as incorporating an
expected retirement age.
59
The basic techniques for calculating lost earning capacity are not
dependent upon the sex of the injured party.60 In either instance, the
economic expert is concerned about rates of wage growth, discount
50. See 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 161 (1988).
51. See id.
52. See Zabel, supra note 2, at 259.
53. Fringe benefits, such as pensions, social security, retirement, and profit sharing are in-
cluded within the future earnings projections. See id. at 259 & n.62.
54. See id.
55. See DEUTSCH & RAFFA, supra note 13, § 110.11[2], at 110-8; see also infra notes 181-186
and accompanying text.
56. See Marvin A. Brains & Norfleet W. Rives, Jr., The Determination of Economic Loss in
Tort Cases: The Relative Impact of Sex and Race, 6 J. CONTEMP. L. 121, 125 (1979) (describing
working life tables published by the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics which provide
gender-specific projections).
57. See Chamallas, supra note 4, at 81.
58. See DEUTSCH & RAFFA, supra note 13, § 110.13, at 110-24.47.
59. See id. § 110.13 at 110-24.47, § 110.14 at 110-25.
60. See MICHAEL L. BROOKSHERE & STAN V. SMITH, ECONOMIC/HEDONIC DAMAGES: THE
PRAcTcE BOOK FOR PLAPrFF AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS § 7.2, at 118 (2d prtg., 1991).
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rates, and employee contributions to fringe benefits. 61 However, "a
pattern of differences exists for women as a group in three areas: (1)
labor force attachment; (2) earnings patterns; and (3) nonmarket serv-
ices." 62 Each of these may be important in estimating lost earning
capacity.63
1. Labor Force Attachment
Because a projection of lost wages is made for the duration of the
plaintiff's expected working life,64 a basic issue in determining dam-
ages is the probability that the plaintiff will be participating in the
work force and employed at any point in time.65 To determine partici-
pation probability, the working life expectancy of the plaintiff needs to
be determined. 66 Typically, the common practice is the use of working
life tables published by the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics.
These tables provide the expected number of working-life years re-
maining for men and women at any given age. The tables also provide
the expected number of working life years for women according to
their marital and child care status.67 Life rates are higher for women
than men.6 8 However, the participation rate at any age is lower for
women.69 Past discrimination in the hiring and retention of women
has lowered their labor force participation. 70 This makes the employ-
ment probability lower for the average woman and, all other things
being equal, lowers earning capacity estimations for women as com-
pared to men.71
61. See id.; see also Zabel, supra note 2, at 254 (describing the method of calculating lost
future earnings).
62. BROOKSI-RE & SMITH, supra note 60, § 7.2, at 118.
63. See id.
64. See Brains & Rives, supra note 56, at 125.
65. See BRoosHIE & SMITH, supra note 60, § 7.2, at 118.
66. See id.
67. See Brains & Rives, supra note 56, at 125.
68. See BRooKKsnin & SMITH, supra note 60, § 7.2, at 118; Chamallas, supra note 4, at 81.
See also Lea Brilmayer et al., The Efficient Use of Group Averages as Nondiscrimination: A
Rejoinder to Professor Benston, 50 U. Cm. L. REV. 222 (1983), for the argument that employers
should use gender-neutral life-expectancy tables in employer-sponsored insurance plans.
69. See BROOKSHIRE & SMITH, supra note 60, § 7.2, at 118; Chamallas, supra note 4, at 81.
70. See Brams & Rives, supra note 56, at 127; Ray Marshall & Beth Paulin, Employment
and Earnings of Women: Historical Perspective, in WORKING WO~mN: PAST, PRESENT, FuTURE 1
(Karen Shallcross Koziara et al. eds., 1987) ("The cause of today's male-female occupational and
earnings patterns are deeply rooted in history, social attitudes, and power relations between
labor and management and between workers themselves-both in the workplace and in society
at large.").
71. Interestingly, employment rates for those seeking jobs (participating) are not very dif-
ferent for woman as opposed to men. See BROOKSMRE & SMITH, supra note 60, § 7.2, at 118.
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It is the participation probability which results in the earning ca-
pacity difference between men and women.72 The difference in partic-
ipation rates may be caused by the belief (both in the past and the
continuing belief by some United States subcultures) that men should
work for remuneration and women should be housewives.73 Another
possible reason is that women may remain out of the work force dur-
ing pregnancy and may choose not to work while raising their chil-
dren.74 By assuming a norm of withdrawal, courts are provided with a
justification for discounting the damage award of female plaintiffs to
account for the average woman's childbearing years, 75 or for the "neg-
ative" contingency of marriage.76 In discounting the damage award
for child-bearing years or marriage, the courts have deviated from the
literal definition of lost earnings as a "capacity. '77
Because the participation rate for women has been dramatically




75. See Caron v. United States, 410 F. Supp. 378, 398 (D.R.I. 1975), affd, 548 F.2d 366 (1st
Cir. 1976) (stating that it was proper for Plaintiff's expert to exempt a ten-year period from the
lost earning computations to account for the average female's child-bearing years); see also Feld-
man v. Allegheny Airlines, 382 F. Supp. 1271, 1286 (D. Conn. 1974) (stating that eight years is
the "middle of the range of a professional woman's likely hiatus from her principal occupation in
order to raise a family").
76. See Frankel v. Heym, 466 F.2d 1226, 1229 (3d Cir. 1972) (predicting that the attractive
plaintiff would marry and bear children "with consequent substantial interruptions of gainful
employment"); see also infra notes 120-33 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the un-
fairness of using a marriage contingency in cases of female plaintiffs, see Cassels, supra note 3, at
453-58.
77. See Chamallas, supra note 4, at 82. This also deviates from the notion that awards for
lost earning capacity are awards "for the value of the time of the injured person." DAN B.
DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-Eourry-RESTrrU=ON § 8.1(2), at 367 (2d ed. 1993).
Another consideration in the use of working life tables for female plaintiffs is that a change
in marital or child-care status is not always explicitly recognized in the published tables.
Although judges often discount the damage award for the contingency of marriage and child-
rearing, a change in the opposite direction is not recognized. Thus, a women who is married at
the time of trial, but later gets divorced, is assumed to still have the participation rate of a
married woman, an average which is often lower than for divorced or widowed women. See
Brains & Rives, supra note 56, at 127.
There is an additional method in which misuse of actuarial statistics occurs. Use of these
tables in calculating damages for women often results in double discounting. See Elaine Gibson,
The Gendered Wage Dilemma in Personal Injury Damages, in TORT THEORY 185, 198 (Ken
Cooper-Stephenson & Elaine Gibson eds., 1993). Judges and lawyers are often unfamiliar with
the sources of actuarial data; thus, they apply contingency factors when those same factors are
already incorporated into the tables. See id. For example, the tables include a reduction for
women's anticipated absence from the paid labor force. Lawyers in negotiating, and judges in
calculating damages, inadvertently apply a second reduction for the same contingency. Double-
discounting thus results in serious under-compensation of injured women. See id.
78. See BRooSH.IRE & SMITH, supra note 60, § 7.2, at 123; Brams & Rives, supra note 56,
at 127. This may be the most significant labor force event since World War II. Obviously, chang-
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the current tables underestimate future work life durations for wo-
men.79 A major implication of the change in the female participation
rate is that an economic expert would be conservative in projecting
into the future the employment probability for an average woman by
using even as much as a ten-year historical average of female partici-
pation rates.80 The historical average is the time period the economist
thinks is appropriate for projecting into the future. 81 A ten-year his-
torical average would use data from the previous ten years as a basis
for projecting into the future. A basis for growth projection requires
that sufficient years of documented wage history be used.8 However,
because the female participation rate is steadily increasing, using data
from the past ten years would not accurately reflect the participation
rates of present-day and future women.
Actuarial tables are generated from age-based data collected
over the fifty years prior to the present date.83 In tort, a projection of
lost earnings must be able to provide an earnings projection for up to
sixty-five years into the future. 84 The tables on which the future earn-
ing projections are based were collected from a period when women
had less opportunity for higher education and were "far less likely to
be part of the paid labour force, rendering the available statistical
pool diminutive and skewed." 85 Under these circumstances, the past
may not predict the future very well. 86 If based on inequitable, back-
ing social norms regarding women in the workplace are a major reason, along with single-parent
households. See BROOKSH-RE & SMrrH, supra note 60, § 7.2, at 123; see also infra note 227.
79. See Brams & Rives, supra note 56, at 127. "Despite the inherent limitations of working
life tables, they have been generally accepted by the courts." Id.; cf Reilly v. United States, 665
F. Supp. 976, 997 (D.R.I. 1987) (expressing serious doubt as to the probative value of women's
work history statistics, "particularly in light of current, ongoing changes in women's labor force
participation rates").
80. See BROOKSmHR & SMITH, supra note 60, § 7.2, at 123.
81. See id. § 3.3, at 31.
82. See id. Brookshire and Smith note that some economists argue that a very long histori-
cal period should be used for projecting into the future, on the basis that the longer the time
period examined, the more accurate any future prediction will be. See id. If data from the end
of World War II to the present were available, these economists would use them for calculating
the growth rate. See id. Brookshire and Smith also note that other economists argue that a
shorter, more current time period, such as the past decade, is more relevant to the future and
should be used as the historical period. See id. However, there may be market anomalies for
that time frame which render the projection skewed. Yet another group of economists, accord-
ing to Brookshire and Smith, prefer to use the same number of years in the historical period as is
being projected into the future. See id. This is called the "mirror image" method. See id. As a
general guideline, however, less than five years is not enough for a wage projection because it
does not provide an adequate time frame from which to determine future market trends. See id.
83. See Gibson, supra note 77, at 197.
84. See id. at 198.
85. Id. at 197.
86. Brookshire and Smith note that to counter this problem, and to accommodate the up-
ward trend in participation rates of women, they use only the last reported year of data. BROOK-
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ward-looking data, the future earning projection maintains the wage
disparity between the sexes.87 It is not presently known how quickly
the equalization of wages will occur, but assumptions of continuing
gender inequality are inappropriate. 88
To further complicate matters, females "vary further around the
average than do males."89 Accordingly, it is more difficult to discuss
"statistical averages" for females.90 This raises questions about the
reliability of actuarial expertise (based on gender as the determinative
factor) in assessing losses incurred by injured women-an expertise
that is increasingly relied upon in serious personal injury cases. 91
2. Earnings Patterns
In addition to their lower work force participation rates, women
also have lower earning scales than men. Median annual earnings for
women are approximately seventy-two percent of the median earnings
for men.92 Women also, on average, enter and exit the work force at a
greater rate than do men.93 To the extent that this behavior hurts job
seniority, women's irregular work schedules may be a factor in lower-
ing the pay of women versus men.94 However, even considering fac-
tors such as lower participation rates, sex discrimination appears to
SHIRE & SMrriH, supra note 60, § 7.2, at 123. However, the problem with relying on only one
year in determining the future earning base of an individual is that it may be subject to excep-
tional economic circumstances related to the prior year. The annual earnings in the last year of
work may have been unusually high or low. A "quirky" year should not be the basis for project-
ing wage losses. By using gender-neutral data tables, one can still base future earnings on histor-
ical averages while taking into consideration the rising trend in participation rates.
87. See Gibson, supra note 77, at 198.
88. See id.; Marshall & Paulin, supra note 70, at 46. Marshall and Paulin conclude that
younger women are likely to retain a substantial amount of the improvement in their
relative earnings as they age. Moreover, the observation that young women are now
entering less traditional occupations and are spending more time in the labor market
reinforces our conclusion that they are likely to continue faring better than their prede-
cessors at each point of the life cycle. As this occurs, the overall sex gap in earnings,
and income, should decline considerably more as earlier cohorts of women with rela-
tively low earnings are replaced by the more recent cohorts with higher earnings.
Id.
89. BROOKSHIRE & SMrH, supra note 60, § 7.2, at 123. Whereas the majority of men have
roughly the same participation rate, the majority of women do not. Women tend to range from
one extreme to the other.
90. See id.
91. See Gibson, supra note 77, at 197.
92. See WoRKNGa WOMEN CHARTBOOK, supra note 8, at 21. In 1979, female earnings for
full-time workers were 60.2% of male earnings. Women employed full-time as executives, ad-
ministrators, and managers had median earnings that were 60.5% of the earnings for men in
1987. However, the overall relationship of female to male earnings for 1987 was 65%. See
MICHAEL L. BROOKSHIRE ET AL, ECONOMIcIHEDONIc DAMAGES: THE PRAcriCE BOOK FOR
PLAINTIFF AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS § 7.2, 44 (Supp. 1992/1993).




remain a factor in explaining the male-female pay gap.95 Past discrim-
ination in the hiring and retention of women has decreased their labor
force participation rates and thus their estimated worklife
expectancies. 96
One study in particular has examined the result of the earning
pattern and worklife expectancy differences between men and women.
In 1985, the Institute for Civil Justice undertook a detailed study of
aviation accident litigation in the United States.97 The study found
that when a woman died in an airline accident, the mean compensa-
tion received by her beneficiaries was $218,395.98 When a man died in
an airline accident, the mean compensation paid to his beneficiaries
was $458,792-more than double that received by the beneficiaries of
women.99 The disparity between the sexes stems largely from differ-
ences in income, worklife expectancy, and salary growth.' °
The authors of the study found that income differences and wor-
klife expectancies together explain ninety-four percent of the sex dif-
ferences in economic losses.101 Salary growth differences explain the
remaining six percent of the difference in economic loss awards be-
tween men and women.' 02 For every year that the men's salary
growth rate exceeds the women's, this leads to larger losses.'0 3 Pri-
marily because men work more hours each year than women, ex-
pected male salary growth is larger than women's for every year of
age.'0 4 Consequently, the already large disparities between men and
women in base-year incomes become even greater as the decedents
age.' 05
95. See, e.g., F. RAY MARSHALL ET AL, LABOR ECONOMIcS 574 (1984); BROOKSIrnE &
SMrri, supra note 60, § 7.2, at 125.
96. See Brains & Rives, supra note 56, at 127. Although lower female worklife expectancies
can be attributed to reasons other than discrimination, such as the fact many women voluntarily
leave the work force to raise children, generally awards to women may be "unjustifiably" lower
than awards to men. See id.
97. See KING & SMrrH, supra note 26, at ix.
98. See id. at ix, 45.
99. See id.
100. See id. at ix.
101. See id. at ix, 46.
102. See id.
103. See id. at ix.
104. See id. at 46.
105. See id. It should be noted, however, that the base-level pay gap between men and wo-
men is narrowing. Although the Bureau of Labor Statistics cites the difference between women's
and men's wages as 74 cents on the dollar, a 1996 salary survey by WORING WOMAN magazine
shows that in the 28 fields for which salary information was available by gender, women typically
earned 85% to 95% of what men in similar jobs earned. See Diane Harris, How Does Your Pay
Stack Up?, WoRING WOMAN, Feb. 1996, at 27. The occupational fields listed in the study,
however, are mostly higher education positions. See The 1996 Salary Survey, WORKING Wo-
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In specific cases involving the earning capacity of women, the fact
that the earnings differential of average women is below that of aver-
age men may be of no significance. When the injured or deceased
woman has wage history for many years, the future will be projected
on the basis of her own earnings and her average annual rate of
growth in wage earnings.1' 6 However, where the woman does not
have an earnings record which can be used as a basis for projecting
future losses, the use of the sex-specific data tables reflects and per-
petuates these problems.
Earning pattern differences, when projected for a remaining lifes-
pan, produce drastically different outcomes by gender. 107 The use of
these tables produces a grossly inequitable result based on a "fortui-
tous" circumstance of doubtful relevance: the defendant injured a wo-
man rather than a man. 108
3. Nonmarket Services
The final area in which women differ from men in terms of lost
earning capacity estimates is the value of their nonmarket services.
Damage awards based on market notions of future earning capacity
ignore the significant amount of nonmarket labor performed by wo-
men.10 9 Household services provided by the wife and/or mother con-
stitute the main category of nonmarket services. 110 One estimation is
that "women's yearly nonmarket hours are nearly twice those of
men.""' Women may recover lower compensation awards because
our system of justice does not accurately value such nonmarket
activities. 1 2
Some argue that a plaintiff should be compensated for the value
of productive activities such as cooking, shopping, caring for children,
MAN, Feb. 1996, at 29. This most likely accounts for the disparity between the Working Woman
figures and the Bureau of Labor Statistics figures, which are not limited to the 28 fields examined
by Working Woman.
106. Of course, in situations like this there may be a disparity between women who work
(and are paid less than similarly situated men) and women with the same education and career
aspirations who are not currently working (and thus could receive a "gender-neutral" award
because they have no past earnings to project their future earnings). This results in a situation
where equal women may receive unequal damage awards. However, a situation like this is still
preferable to the present one where both women would receive the lower award. As time pro-
gresses and women's work is paid the same as men's, this disparity will disappear.
107. See Gibson, supra note 77, at 199.
108. See id.
109. See ILLINOIs REPORT, supra note 26, at 190.
110. See BROOKSHIRE & SMITH, supra note 60, at 126.
111. KING & SMITH, supra note 26, at 15.
112. See ILLINOIS REPORT, supra note 26, at 191.
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and caring for the home, which take place outside the formal labor
market, yet nonetheless have value.113 Some states now take into ac-
count the value of nonmarket services when evaluating the amount of
a husband's loss from the death of his wife. 114 Juries are often in-
structed to consider the replacement cost of the woman's services.
However, the value of a woman's nonmarket labor in the home be-
comes relevant only when she is dead, not when she is alive and suing
to recover on her own behalf.
1" 5
Legal scholars argue that even the replacement cost method of
evaluating an injured woman's lost earnings underestimates the value
of her services. Judge Richard A. Posner suggests:
[A] minimum estimate of a disabled housewife's lost earnings is the
wage she would have commanded in the market (summed over the
estimated period of disability and then discounted to present value
at the appropriate interest rate), for if the earnings were less, she
would switch from household to market employment. 16
According to Posner, the replacement cost method ignores the quality
dimension of the services performed by the woman herself, compared
to someone hired to perform them in her stead. 1 7 There is an argu-
ment, therefore, that the damages awarded to a housewife should take
into account the opportunity cost of her having foregone employment
in the market economy in order to perform nonmarket work in the
home. By doing so, the woman's true earning capacity can be valued.
However, the tables upon which future earnings are determined
are based on market values and do not take into account the work
performed by women in the home. Thus, determinations of earning
capacity based on actuarial tables undercompensate women for their
work by ignoring the value of women's nonmarket services.
113. See KING & SMm, supra note 26, at 15.
114. See ILLINOIS REPORT, supra note 26, at 191. In New York, for example, juries are in-
structed concerning the value of services in the home:
In fixing that value you must take into consideration the circumstances and condition of
her husband and children; the services she would have performed for her husband and
children in the care and management of the family home, finance and health; the intel-
lectual, moral and physical guidance and assistance she would have given the children
had she lived. In fixing the money value of decedent to the widower and children you
must consider what it would cost to pay for a substitute for her services, considering
both decedent's age and life expectancy of her husband and each of her children.
UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, REPORT OF THE NEW YORK TASK
FORCE ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS 127 (1986), cited in ILLINOIS REPORT, supra note 26, at 191.
115. See id.




C. Judicial Traditions in Calculating Lost Future Earning Awards
Courts have traditionally calculated lost future earning awards
for women while considering a number of "negative" contingencies.
For example, courts have decreased damage estimations by sub-
tracting the time a woman might be out of the workforce to raise chil-
dren. Similarly, courts have considered the effect of marriage on a
woman's working life. Frankel v. United States1 8 and Caron v. United
States 1 9 are two examples of the traditional approach used by courts
when calculating lost future earning capacity.
The principal plaintiff in Frankel v. United States was a nineteen-
year-old woman named Marilyn Heym, who suffered severe injuries
20
as the result of an automobile accident.121 In determining Heym's lost
future earning capacity, the court noted that one of Heym's brothers
was a mechanical engineer and the other was in medical school.' 22 At
the time of the accident, Heym had completed two years of a four-
year course in commercial art and was expected to graduate and enter
a career as a commercial artist. 123 Heym excelled in art.' 24 However,
despite the evidence of her promising future, the court noted that con-
sideration must be given to other factors such as the likelihood of
marriage and motherhood, and the effect such occurrences would
have on earning capacity: 25
Marilyn's life of 19 1/2 years, prior to her devastating injuries,
presents a clear picture of prospects for marriage. She was attrac-
tive, healthy, talented, well-adjusted, and intelligent .... There was
a likelihood of marriage and motherhood in her future. Marriage
probably would have interrupted her career, but with her training
she could have resumed her career, if it had become necessary or
desirable during or after marriage.'
26
118. 321 F. Supp. 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
119. 548 F.2d 366 (1st Cir. 1976).
120. When taken to the emergency room, Heym was in severe shock and appeared to be
near death. Frankel, 321 F. Supp. at 1335. Her injuries included a compound fracture of the
skull, severe brain damage, severe crush injuries to her left hand and wrist, a comminuted frac-
ture-dislocation of the carpal and metacarpal bones of the left hand, a fracture of the left
clavicle, contusions of her kidneys, and symptoms of gross convulsive seizures. See id. at 1335-
36. Her entire body was spastic, her arms and legs were extended, her hands were deformed, her
eyes were rolled back, she had severe bleeding lacerations, and she was bleeding vaginally and
through her ears. See id. at 1336. After the accident, her mental age was 5.13 years and her
memory was worse than 98% of the population. See id. Heyn became psychotic, obsessed with
food, and subject to emotional outbursts. See id.
121. Id. at 1333.




126. See id. at 1338.
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Although the plaintiff's economist calculated Heym's future earn-
ings at $237,630, based on the income of a commercial artist working
continuously until retirement, 127 the trial court reduced that amount
by half, estimating Heym's future income as only $125,000, based on
the assumption that she would marry and have children, thus inter-
rupting her career.128 The trial court's large discount was upheld on
appeal. 2 9 The court of appeals stated that the "district court, taking
into account evidence of Miss Heym's temperament and personality,
deemed it probable that she would have married and borne children,
with consequent substantial interruptions of gainful employment....
This determination was not arbitrary or unreasonable."'1 30 Although
the opinion was written twenty-five years ago, Frankel authorized di-
minished awards to women because of the assumption that women
will not work as many years as men at compensated work131 despite
women's longer life expectancy 32 and despite the fact that loss of
earning capacity is supposed to measure potential, rather than prob-
able earnings. 133
The court in Caron v. United States'34 also used the traditional
mode of calculation in determining lost future earning capacity. The
court in Caron permitted lower awards to women, even for those
years in which the court assumed that the women would work full-
time. Monique Caron's injuries resulted from the negligent adminis-
tration of an adult dosage of several immunizations when she was four
months old.135 As a result of the injections, Caron was permanently
brain damaged. 36 Although her attorney did not contest the assump-
tion that Caron would probably have married and thus interrupted
her working life,137 he argued that the damage calculation should be
127. See Frankel, 466 F.2d at 1229.
128. See id. In support of its decision, the district court cited Vincent v. Philadelphia, 35 A.2d
65, 67 (Pa. 1944), for the proposition that reduced awards to women are proper because of the
"lower rate of wages ordinarily obtainable in the industrial world by women as compared with
men, and the likelihood of marriage and motherhood, with their resulting effect on the girl's
opportunity and capacity to continue through life as a wage earner."
129. See Frankel, 466 F.2d at 1229.
130. Id.
131. See id.
132. See 2 NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, VITAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1991 § 6 (1995).
133. See supra note 10.
134. 548 F.2d 366 (1st Cir. 1976).
135. See Caron v. United States, 410 F. Supp. 378, 385 (D.R.I. 1975), affd, 548 F.2d 366 (1st
Cir. 1976).
136. See id.
137. In fact, plaintiff's own expert exempted a ten-year period from his computations to ac-
count for "the average female's child bearing years." Id. at 398.
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based on the earnings of an average worker, rather than on the earn-
ings of the average female worker.138 In support of using gender-neu-
tral data, plaintiff cited "existing Federal and State legislation and the
present trend towards equality in employment."'1 39 The court dis-
agreed, stating:
I am constrained to agree with the defense that the present value of
prospective earnings, female wages, before taxes must be used.
However sympathetic this Court may be to equality in employment,
it. must look to the reality of the situation and not be controlled by
its own convictions. One does not need expert testimony to con-
clude that there is inequality in the average earnings of the sexes.
There is no criterion to help us predict when this unwarranted con-
dition will be remedied and as a consequence I feel compelled to
adopt the defendant's position .... 140
On appeal, the defendant contested the award, claiming the
amount was speculative because there was no showing Caron would
have ever worked.' 4' The court refused to set aside the award for
future earning capacity, stating that Caron could not be blamed for
being unable to prove the exact amount for future earning capacity. 42
The court intimated that Caron's award had been unfairly low because
she was a female, citing a case in which an eight-year-old boy had
been awarded an amount almost triple what Caron received for lost
future earning capacity. 43 The court went on to say, without elabora-





140. Id. In addition to cases endorsing gender-based tables for calculating lost earning ca-
pacity, there are numerous wrongful death cases in which the sex of the child is regarded as a
legitimate factor in determining the amount of the pecuniary loss suffered by the surviving par-
ents. The typical jury instruction requires the jurors to consider "the age, sex and physical and
mental characteristics of the child, supplemented, when available, with evidence as to the posi-
tion in life and earning capacity of the parents, as well as evidence as to the rendition, if any, of
household services by the minor." Chamallas, supra note 4, at 95; see also Immel v. Richards, 93
N.E.2d 474, 475 (Ohio 1950); Franchell v. Sims, 424 N.Y.S.2d 959, 962 (App. Div. 1980). The
standard formulation suggests "the sex of the child is relevant because of the assumption that sex
is a good predictor of earning capacity." Chamallas, supra note 4, at 95.
141. See Caron, 548 F.2d at 371.
142. See id.




D. A Case Refusing to Rely on Gender Specific Data in
Determining Damages
Although the courts traditionally have not been receptive to the
use of gender-neutral data,145 one case is notable for refusing to rely
on sex-specific data in determining the lost future earning capacity of
the female plaintiffs: Reilly v. United States.146
In Reilly, the plaintiff, Heather Reilly, was a "helpless individ-
ual"'147 who was "significantly delayed developmentally,"'148 and un-
able to see, walk, talk, or take care of herself in any way.' 49 Heather's
brain damage was the result of severe fetal distress during labor and
delivery which was not properly diagnosed or attended to by medical
personnel. 50 In assessing the propriety of the economists' determina-
tions of lost future earnings, the court noted that all three economists
who testified shared certain assumptions: Heather would complete
four years of college, she would enter the labor force in the year 2007
at age twenty-two, and her work capacity would extend to the age of
seventy.' 51 However, the defendant's economist further assumed that
Heather would not work forty percent of that time.' 52 This assump-
tion was based on the Bureau of Labor Statistics' work life tables,
showing that a woman with fifteen or more years of education would
be active in the labor force for twenty-eight years.' 53 The court, how-
ever, rejected the economist's reduction, which was based solely on a
survey of women's work histories from 1978 until 1980.154 The court
exhibited serious doubt as to the probative value of such statistics with
respect to twenty-first century women's labor force patterns, "particu-
larly in light of current, ongoing changes in women's labor force par-
ticipation rates."'155
145. See supra notes 134-40 and accompanying text.
146. Reilly v. United States, 665 F. Supp. 976 (D.R.I. 1987). Interestingly, the opinion in
Reilly was written by the same judge who wrote the Caron opinion.
147. Id. at 979.
148. Id.
149. See id.
150. See id. at 979-980.
151. See id. at 995.
152. See id. at 995, 997.
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. Id. See also Wheeler Tarpeh-Doe v. United States, 771 F. Supp. 427 (D.D.C. 1991),
rev'd on other grounds, 28 F.3d 120 (D.C. Cir. 1994), a case involving the categorization of a bi-
racial child's earning potential. In Wheeler Tarpeh-Doe, the court stated that "it would be inap-
propriate to incorporate current discrimination resulting in wage differences between the sexes
or races or the potential for any future such discrimination into a calculation for damages result-
ing from lost wages." Id. at 455. However, in that case, the result of eliminating any nondiscrim-
inatory factors actually lowered the plaintiff's award beyond what even the defendant's expert
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II. THE CURRENT METHOD OF INTRODUCING EVIDENCE OF LOST
EARNING CAPACITY AND ITs APPLICATION TO THE
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
Where appropriate, an attorney representing an injured plaintiff
should present testimony of a qualified economist-statistician to assist
the trier of fact in arriving at an award which will reflect, as much as
possible, the plaintiff's true amount of lost future earning potential as
a result of the injury. 156 Regardless of the type of injury, where the
plaintiff has sustained substantial future economic loss, the use of an
economist-statistician becomes almost essential. 157 The economist
provides the jury with a detailed opinion of the future earnings, which
the plaintiff would have had the capacity to earn if he or she had not
been injured or killed.' 58 In assessing the propriety of admitting ex-
pert testimony, it is necessary for the court to determine that the evi-
dence is relevant and that the expert is qualified to testify on the
subject matter at issue.
A. Relevance
The law of evidence presupposes that, in judging the claims of
litigants, it is important to discern the facts underlying the dispute.1 59
In pursuing this objective, the law assumes that the way to determine
the truth is to allow the parties to present all evidence that bears on
the issue to be decided by the trier of fact.' 60 Unless there is some
distinct ground for refusing to hear such evidence, it should be admit-
ted.' 6' Conversely, evidence that lacks probative value' 62 should be
had estimated. See id. at 456. The average wages for all persons was lower than the average
wage for black men because of the incorporation of women's average earnings. See id. The
court noted this fact but held that "estimating [the child's] future earnings based on the average
earnings of all persons appears to be the most accurate means available of eliminating any dis-
criminatory factors." Id.
156. See O'Connor & Miller, supra note 15, at 354.
157. See id.
158. See-id. at 355.
159. See EDWARD W. CLEARY, McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 184, at 540 (3d ed. 1984).
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. Probative value is a relative concept. Determining the probative value of an item of
evidence involves measuring the degree to which the evidence assists the trier of fact in deter-
mining whether the particular fact exists and determining the distance from the particular fact to
an ultimate issue in the case. See Andrew K. Dolan, Rule 403: The Prejudice Rule in Evidence,
49 S. CAL L. REV. 220, 233 (1976).
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excluded.163 Federal Rule of Evidence 402 adopts the axioms of fair-
ness and accuracy. 164
1. Rule 402
Rule 402 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that "[a]ll rel-
evant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules,
or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statu-
tory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.' 165
The main clause of Rule 402 indicates that logically relevant evi-
dence is presumptively admissible. Expert testimony on lost future
earning capacity is relevant in that it tends to prove or disprove an
issue in the case, i.e., how much the plaintiff would be capable of earn-
ing in the future.
An expert's estimate of impaired or lost economic value, particu-
larly in cases involving children or housewives with no demonstrated
earning capacity, is often met by the objection that such calculations
are too speculative or conjectural to be admissible as relevant evi-
dence.166 It is also argued that admitting these calculations into evi-
dence usurps the province of the trier of fact because the jury
members are capable of doing the computation themselves. 67 Typi-
cally, this argument is countered by noting that, as with any expert
opinion, the calculation of economic loss is meaningful, not necessar-
ily as fact, but as a credible opinion which aids the trier of fact in
determining an appropriate compensatory award. 68 The question
163. See CLEARY, supra note 159, § 184, at 540. Innumerable cases state this presupposition
of admissibility. See, e.g., United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 51 (1984); United States v. Levy-
Cordero, 67 F.3d 1002, 1016 (1st Cir. 1995); Espeaignnette v. Gene Tierney Co., Inc., 43 F.3d 1, 9
(1st Cir. 1994); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Manville Sales Corp., 27 F.3d 1089,
1093 (5th Cir. 1994); Miller v. Yazoo Mfg. Co., 26 F.3d 81, 82 (8th Cir. 1994); Malek v. Federal
Ins. Co., 994 F.2d 49, 53 (2d Cir. 1993).
164. FED. R. EviD. 402.
165. Id.
166. See Caron v. United States, 548 F.2d 366, 371 (1st Cir. 1976); Larsen v. International
Bus. Machs. Corp., 87 F.R.D. 602, 610 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (defendant argued that submission of
work life tables injected an issue of speculation that warranted a new trial); Bulala v. Boyd, 389
S.E.2d 670, 677-78, (Va. 1990), certifying question to 877 F.2d 1191 (4th Cir. 1989).
167. See O'Connor & Miller, supra note 15, at 357. The foundation of Rule 702 is that the
testimony must be helpful to the jury. As defined by the Advisory Committee, the helpfulness
inquiry is "whether the untrained layman would be qualified to determine intelligently and to
the best possible degree the particular issue without enlightenment from those having a special-
ized understanding of the subject involved in the dispute." FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory commit-
tee's note (quoting Mason Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REv. 414, 418 (1952)).
168. See O'Connor & Miller, supra note 15, at 357. Several courts have noted that merely
because a damage theory is, relative to other proof, somewhat uncertain, it is not therefore
inadmissible. See, for example, Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S.
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should be "one of weight, not admissibility."' 169 To overcome an at-
tack on admissibility, the calculation of impaired or lost economic
value must involve methods beyond the competency of laymen and
must be within the special province of the expert. 70
One persuasive decision on the point was rendered by the
Supreme Court of Montana. 71 The court noted that an economist's
testimony is no more speculative than any other evidence that is used
to prove future events.' 72 The court explained that the element of
conjecture is significantly reduced by the admission of the economist's
testimony as to possible future earnings173 because the economist has
studied economic trends and is better qualified to predict future eco-
nomic trends than jurors. Moreover, according to the court, this kind
of expert testimony is not only the best evidence, but the only avail-
able evidence to prove future earnings. 174
Because statistics are necessary for determining future earning
capacity when the plaintiff has no earnings record, it is likely the
courts will find that testimony by an economist as to the plaintiff's
future earnings is relevant.175
2. Rule 403
Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states that "[a]lthough
relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."'1 76
Rule 403 gives the court the discretion to exclude otherwise admissi-
555, 562 (1931), in which the Supreme Court noted "a clear distinction between the measure of
proof necessary to establish the fact that petitioner had sustained some damage and the measure
of proof necessary to enable the jury to fix the amount." See also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazel-
tine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969) (suggesting that since a defendant, against whom a
finding of liability has been found, has been shown to be the wrongdoer, it would be unfair to
preclude a plaintiff from recovering merely because it is difficult to assess damages with
certainty).
169. O'Connor & Miller, supra note 15, at 357.
170. See id.
171. See Krohmer v. Dahl, 402 P.2d 979 (Mont. 1965).
172. See id. at 981.
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. But see Bulala v. Boyd, 389 S.E.2d 670, 677-78 (Va. 1990), certifying question to 877 F.2d
1191 (4th Cir. 1989), where the Virginia Supreme Court held that reasonably certain quantifica-
tion evidence is required before the jury is permitted to consider the issue of lost earning capac-
ity for an infant plaintiff. The court further held that choosing average incomes and life
expectancies that account only for age, race, and gender are insufficient to allow a jury to award
an infant plaintiff damages for lost earning capacity. See id. at 678.
176. FED. R. Evro. 403.
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ble evidence when the probative value 177 of that evidence is "substan-
tially outweighed" by, among other things, "unfair prejudice."'
1 78
Thus, Rule 403 authorizes the trial judge to balance the probative
value of an item of evidence against its attendant probative dangers,
and to exclude relevant evidence when the dangers substantially out-
weigh the probative value.
Although the judge can exclude statistical data on the ground
that it is prejudicial, statistical data may be the only evidence avail-
able. Furthermore, many litigants do not argue that the dangers in-
herent in the use of actuarial tables substantially outweigh their
probativeness, despite the fact that gender-specific data is outmoded
and often irrelevant and prejudicial to the plaintiff in the instant
case.179 As a result, sex-specific statistical evidence is usually admitted
into evidence.
B. Expert Testimony
In order for expert testimony regarding lost future earning capac-
ity to be allowed at trial, the testimony of the expert must assist the
trier of fact and the expert must be qualified to testify. Paul M.
Deutsch and Frederick A. Raffa have set forth a detailed procedure
for economists to use in calculating lost earning capacity in cases in
which the plaintiff has no established earnings record. 18 0 The authors
describe two methods for calculating the base annual earnings level of
the plaintiff. The first method involves an individualized determina-
tion of the plaintiff's future educational attainment. The second
method relies on statistical averages of educational attainment levels.
The first method requires the economist to predict the level of
educational attainment the plaintiff would have achieved. 181 This pre-
diction sometimes can be accomplished by subjecting the plaintiff to
aptitude testing and by taking into consideration the socio-economic
status of the family, including the educational level of siblings and par-
ents, as well as the family's ability to finance a higher education. 182
177. See supra note 162.
178. FED. R. Evro. 403.
179. Martha Chamallas notes that her research reveals that it is often the attorney for the
female plaintiff who introduces gender-specific data. Chamallas, supra note 4, at 76; cf. Drayton
v. Jiffee Chem. Corp., 591 F.2d 352, 362 (6th Cir. 1978) (where the economist for a seven-year-
old black female argued the child was entitled to have her projected loss of income measured by
the income standards of male college graduates). It is therefore unlikely that the parties will
bring to the judge's attention the problems with gender-specific data tables.





The economist must then consult gender-specific government data
listing the average earnings of high school or college graduates.
8 3
The second method the authors recommend relies even more
heavily on explicit gender classifications. Rather than using individu-
alized factors to determine probable educational attainment, the au-
thors state that economists may choose to consult data from the
United States Commerce Department that gives the average educa-
tional levels according to the sex of the plaintiff.184 Just as in the first
method, once the probable educational attainment is predicted, refer-
ence would be made to gender-based tables to calculate probable
earnings. 185
Courts have uncritically accepted such methods of damage calcu-
lation. 86 The use of statistical tables by economists in predicting fu-
ture trends is wide-spread. In the damage calculation context,
actuarial tables may be the only evidence available for determining
lost future earning capacity. 87 This being the case, judges almost al-
ways allow such data. In addition, the liberality of the Federal Rules
of Evidence does not provide for a stringent examination of the use of
such tables.'8 As such, courts often find that expert testimony on
future earning capacity satisfies the requirements of Rules 702 and
703.189
1. Rule 702
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that "[i]f sci-
entific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a wit-
ness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or other-
183. See id. This is the approach the court in Caron employed.
184. See id. These tables also break down average educational attainment by race. See id.
185. See id. at 110-8 to 110-9.
186. See discussion infra Part I.C.
187. See Krohmer v. Dahl, 402 P.2d 979, 981 (Mont. 1965).
188. See infra note 257.
189. But see Bulala v. Boyd, 389 S.E.2d 670, 677-78 (Va. 1990) (The court held that reason-
ably certain quantification evidence is required before the jury is permitted to consider the issue
of lost earning capacity for an infant plaintiff. The court further held that average incomes and
life expectancies that account only for age, race, and gender are insufficient evidence to allow a
jury to award an infant plaintiff damages for lost earning capacity.), certifying question to 877
F.2d 1191 (4th Cir. 1989).
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wise."'190 Thus, the admissibility of expert testimony requires that two
preliminary determinations be made by the court. 191
First, the court must decide whether expert testimony could assist
the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or determining the fact
at issue. 92 The court may be required, as an aspect of this inquiry, to
determine whether a sufficiently reliable body of scientific, technical,
or other specialized knowledge has been developed. 93 Calculating fu-
ture earnings requires factoring in the effect of inflation, income taxes,
and economic growth; thus, such computations are often complex. 94
Hence, courts routinely find that expert testimony on future earnings
assists the trier of fact.
Second, the court must make a preliminary determination under
Rule 104(a) that the witness called is properly qualified as an ex-
pert.' 95 Pursuant to Rule 702, the witness may be qualified as an ex-
pert on the basis of either knowledge, skill, experience, training,
education, or a combination thereof.' 96 Without such specialized
190. FED. R. EvID. 702.
191. See Coleman v. Parkline Corp., 844 F.2d 863, 865 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("This court has
recognized that Rule 702 prescribes a two-part test. First, the witness must be qualified; i.e., he
must have 'knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education' in the field. Second, the wit-
ness's testimony must be able to assist the trier of fact."); Beins v. United States, 695 F.2d 591,
609 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Rule 702 "lays down a two part test for the admissibility of expert testi-
mony: the witness must be qualified and he must be capable of assisting the trier of fact.");
Larsen, 87 F.R.D. at 607 (Rule 702 is "a codification of existing federal law and embodies two
requirements for expert testimony. The first is that the testimony must assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence. The second is that the witness must be qualified as an expert.").
192. See United States v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 416 F. Supp. 313, 315 (D.N.J. 1976)
(stating the purpose of expert testimony is to assist the trier of fact "to understand, evaluate and
decide the complex evidential materials in a case"); see also Monroe L. Inker, A Practical Guide
to Using Expert Testimony Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, PRAc. LAW., July 15, 1985, at 21,
22 ("The focus under the Rules is on the propensity of an expert's testimony to assist the
factfinder, rather than on the complexity of the subject matter being presented.").
193. See Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1208 (6th Cir. 1988) (The court
required, for the admission of expert testimony, that the subject be one which conforms to a
"generally accepted explanatory theory." With respect the this criterion, "the principles upon
which the scientific evidence is based must be sufficiently established to have gained wide ac-
ceptance in the field to which it belongs.").
194. See 22 AM. Jut. 2D Damages § 161 (1988).
195. See FED. R. Evtn. 104(a); see also sources cited supra note 191. Such a determination
lies within the discretion of the trial court. See Ellis v. K-Lan Co., Inc., 695 F.2d 157, 162 (5th
Cir. 1983); N.V. Maatschappij Voor Industriele Waarden v. A.O. Smith Corp., 590 F.2d 415, 418
(2d Cir. 1978).
196. Rule 702 provides that "[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness quali-
fied as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise." FED. R. EvID. 702; see also Will v. Richardson-Merrell,
Inc., 647 F. Supp. 544, 548 (S.D. Ga. 1986) (stating that the crucial factors with respect to admis-
sibility of expert testimony are the actual experience of the witness and probative value of his
opinion). Because the focus is on the witness' actual qualifications, rather than his or her title,
anyone with specialized knowledge may qualify as an expert in that particular area.
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knowledge, the testimony would not assist the jury.197 Similarly, if no
specialized knowledge is needed, the jury will not be aided by the ex-
pert testimony which merely involves the same analytical process of
which the jurors are capable. 198 Clearly, economists have specialized
knowledge and experience; therefore they satisfy the second part of
Rule 702.
2. Rule 703
Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases
an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known
to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied
upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or infer-
ence upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in
evidence. 199
Expert testimony is not limited to scientific or technical areas, but in-
cludes all areas of specialized knowledge.200 The opinion of an expert
must be supported by an adequate foundation of relevant facts, data,
or opinions. 201 Absent such a foundation, the judge must disallow the
expert's opinion as speculation or conjecture. 2°2 The modern view al-
lows experts to rely on data provided by third parties because experts
commonly rely on this type of information in forming an opinion.20 3
In contrast to the common law standard, under which the expert's
opinion was inadmissible if it went beyond the evidence in the case,204
Rule 703 allows the opinion to go beyond the evidence admitted at
trial as long as the facts or data are of a type reasonably relied upon
by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences. 205
197. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1313, 1331 (E.D. Pa.
1980), affd in part, rev'd in part, In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir.
1983).
198. See id.
199. FED. R. EviD. 703.
200. See MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 702.1, at 24 (4th ed.
1996).
201. See id. at 29.
202. See id
203. See Lee Waldman Miller, Cross-Examination of Expert Witnesses: Dispelling the Aura of
Reliability, 42 U. MiAMI L. REV. 1073, 1078 (1988).
204. See id.
205. See FED. R. EvID. 703; see also Mannino v. International Mfg. Co., 650 F.2d 846, 851
(6th Cir. 1981) (stating that an expert can base an opinion on types of data normally relied upon
to form similar opinions even if the information is otherwise inadmissible); Baumholser v. Amax
Coal Co., 630 F.2d 550, 553 (7th Cir. 1980) (explaining that evidence need not be independently
admissible as long as the evidence is of a type reasonably relied upon by other experts in the
field); American Bearing Co. v. Litton Indus., 540 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (stating that
expert testimony should be excluded if misleading and speculative and not of a type reasonably
relied upon in the particular field), affd, 729 F.2d 943 (3d Cir. 1982).
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However, the expert must establish that he or she is not using the
particular information only for purposes of testifying in a lawsuit.
20 6
Courts differ in their treatment of Rule 703's reasonable reliance
requirement.20 7 Some favor the admissibility of expert testimony,208
while others take a more restrictive view.20 9 The difference between
the liberal and restrictive approaches to Rule 703 is one of empha-
sis.210 Both groups agree that the trial judge must determine whether
the data upon which the expert relied is a type upon which others in
his field of expertise reasonably rely.21' The liberal view advocates
admitting the expert testimony if the facts upon which the expert re-
lies are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular
field, thereby allowing jurors to decide whether to accept or reject the
basis of the expert's opinion.212 The court does not separately deter-
mine the trustworthiness of the particular data involved. 213
206. See 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE 703[031, at 703-17 (1987)
[hereinafter J. WEINSTEIN].
207. See Miller, supra note 203, at 1079.
208. Illustrative of the liberal camp are Peteet v. Dow Chem. Co., 868 F.2d 1428, 1432 (5th
Cir. 1989) ("In making this determination, the trial court should defer to the expert's opinion of
what data they find reasonably reliable.") and In re Japanese Elec. Prod., 723 F.2d 238, 277 (3d
Cir. 1983) ("In substituting its own opinion as to what constitutes reasonable reliance for that of
the experts in the relevant fields the trial court misinterpreted Rule 703."), rev'd on other
grounds, 475 U.S. 574, on remand, 807 F.2d 44 (3d Cir. 1986). For a discussion of the liberal and
restrictive approaches, see In re "Agent Orange", 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1243-45 (E.D.N.Y. 1985),
affd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987).
209. See GRAHAM, supra note 200, § 703.1, at 105 n.14. Those courts that endorse a restric-
tive approach do so not only in criminal cases, but in civil cases as well. See id. (citing J. WEIN-
STEIN 703[03], at 703-717).
Illustrative of the restrictive camp are Viterbo v. Dow Chemical Co., 826 F.2d 420, 422 (5th
Cir. 1987) (stating that "[tihough courts have afforded experts a wide latitude in picking and
choosing the sources on which to base opinions, Rule 703 nonetheless requires courts to examine
the reliability of those sources." (quoting Soden v. Freightliner Corp., 714 F.2d 498, 505 (5th Cir.
1983)); Shatkin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 727 F.2d 202, 208 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating that "the
district court, in ruling on the admissibility of the proposed testimony, possessed not only the
power under Fed.R.Evid. 403 to determine whether it had a propensity for misleading or confus-
ing the jury .... but also the discretionary right under Fed.R.Evid. 703 to determine whether
the expert acted reasonably in making assumptions of fact upon which he would base his testi-
mony." (citations omitted)). See also Head v. Lithonia Corp., Inc., 881 F.2d 941, 944 (10th Cir.
1989) where the court held that
implicit in [Rule 703], however, is the court's guidance to make a preliminary determi-
nation pursuant to Rule 104(a) whether the particular underlying data is of a kind that
is reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in reaching conclusions. This
determination must be made on a case-by-case basis and should focus on the reliability
of the opinion and its foundation rather than merely on the fact that it was based,
technically speaking, upon hearsay. Thus, the district court may not abdicate its in-
dependent responsibilities to decide if the bases meet minimum standards of reliability
as a condition of admissibility.
210. See GRAHAM, supra note 200, § 703.1, at 105 n.14.
211. See id.
212. See Miller, supra note 203, at 1079.
213. See In re "Agent Orange", 611 F. Supp. at 1243.
1996]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
In contrast, the restrictive view imposes an additional require-
ment on the reasonable reliance standard: "[tlhe trial judge must reas-
sess the facts, data, or opinions that form the basis of the expert's
opinion to determine if they are sufficiently trustworthy for experts to
reasonably rely upon. '214 If the court determines that the expert
could not reasonably have relied on the material, even though he may
rely on it in his working life, it is not admissible.215
Most courts have adopted the liberal approach. 21 6 Thus the
courts rarely question the use of gender-specific data by experts
because use of such data is firmly entrenched in economic
calculations.21 7
III. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: ACHIEVING GENDER-
NEUTRALITY WHILE REMAINING CONSISTENT WITH THE
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
As noted earlier, the fundamental goals of the Federal Rules are
accuracy and fairness. 218 It is both more fair and more accurate to use
gender-neutral data. The statistical data upon which the gender-based
tables are based is inaccurate in that it does not reflect the "rapid,
sustained increases in women's labor-force participation. '219 Further-
214. GRAHAM, supra note 200, § 703.1, at 105 n.14; Miller, supra note 203, at 1080. In Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., the court set forth the following list of factors
to be used in determining the reasonableness of an expert's reliance on inadmissible information
under Rule 703, which ultimately was rejected by the court of appeals:
(1) The extent to which the opinion is pervaded or dominated by reliance on materials
judicially determined to be inadmissible, on grounds of either relevance or
trustworthiness;
(2) The extent to which the opinion is dominated or pervaded by reliance upon other
untrustworthy materials;
(3) The extent to which the expert's assumptions have been shown to be unsupported,
speculative, or demonstrably incorrect;
(4) The extent to which the materials on which the expert relied are within his immedi-
ate sphere of expertise, are of a kind customarily relied upon by experts in his field
in forming opinions or inferences on that subject, and are not used only for litiga-
tion purposes;
(5) The extent to which the expert acknowledges the questionable reliability of the
underlying information, thus indicating that he has taken that factor into considera-
tion in forming his opinion;
(6) The extent to which reliance on certain material, even if otherwise reasonable, may
be unreasonable in the peculiar circumstances of the case.
505 F.Supp. 1313, 1330 (E.D. Pa. 1980), affd in part, rev'd in par In re Japanese Elec. Prod.
Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1986).
215. See GRAHAM, supra note 200, § 703.1, at 105 n.14.
216. See Miller, supra note 203, at 1080.
217. See Chamallas, supra note 4, at 76-77.
218. See FED. R. Evto. 102; Victor J. Gold, Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Observations on
the Nature of Unfairly Prejudicial Evidence, 58 WASH. L. REv. 497, 499, 503 (1983) [hereinafter
Gold, Rule 403].
219. See KINo & SMrrH, supra note 26, at 14.
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more, the tables reflect past societal discrimination against women in
the workforce. Gender-neutral tables better reflect women's increas-
ing participation rates and pay increases. Moreover, the use of gen-
der-neutral tables comports with the objectives of the Federal Rules
of Evidence. Gender-neutral statistical data is more relevant to a de-
termination of lost earning capacity than sex-specific data and can be
more reasonably relied upon by experts.
A. Relevance
In analyzing whether particular evidence should be admitted, the
judge must determine whether its relevance is substantially out-
weighed by its prejudice.220 This analysis consists of three steps: (1)
determining the probative value of the item of evidence; (2) identify-
ing the countervailing probative dangers (i.e., prejudice); and (3) strik-
ing the balance between the probative values and prejudicial dangers.
1. Determining the Probative Value of the Item of Evidence
The concept of probative value allows the trial judge to consider
three elements when balancing under Rule 403.221 These elements
are: (1) the facial validity of the proposed testimony; (2) the number
of intermediate propositions between the item of evidence and the
ultimate fact to be proved; and (3) the strength of the inference from
the evidence. 222
First, a judge may consider the facial validity of the proposed tes-
timony.22 3 When the testimony is weak on its face, a judge is permit-
ted to consider that weakness.22 4  Using gender-specific tables in
determining lost earning capacity for women aggravates the uncer-
tainty and imprecision in any estimation of lost future earnings. By
using the historical data contained in the female tables, one assumes
that future trends will be identical or similar to past trends-an as-
sumption that is almost certainly erroneous based on the success of
the women's movement. Statistical tables "predict" the future only to
the extent that the future resembles the past;22 5 a predictor is efficient
220. See FED. R. Evm. 403.
221. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Meaning of Probative Value and Prejudice in Federal
Rule of Evidence 403: Can Rule 403 Be Used to Resurrect The Common Law of Evidence?, 41




225. See Brilmayer et al., supra note 68, at 247. The authors state that, by definition, a life
table is simply a mathematical model of the current experiences of a population. Using a unisex
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only if past correlations persist throughout the period in which the
predicted event will occur.226 As evidence indicates, women's partici-
pation rates and wage rates have been steadily increasing.227 As such,
expert testimony based on gender-specific tables is often imprecise.
Second, a judge may consider the number of intermediate pro-
positions between the item of evidence and the ultimate fact that the
item is offered to prove.228 The larger the number of intermediate
inferences the jury must draw, the greater the probability that the jury
will commit some inferential error.229 Inferential error occurs when
the jury decides that evidence is more probative of a fact or event than
it actually i8.230 Jurors, when presented with statistics given by an ex-
pert witness, might assume that this data is, in fact, more probative of
the plaintiff's future earning capacity than it actually is.231 Thus, it is
essential for the judge to determine the relevancy of the expert's
methods of calculation, as they apply to the plaintiff. Where it is ap-
table mirrors the experience of a combined male and female population with no loss of predict-
ability. The authors note that when mortality rates change, a life table will be a poor predictor
no matter how the data were classified. Although predicting changes in the mortality of a popu-
lation is difficult, predicting changes in mortality on the basis of sex is even more difficult. See id.
226. See id. at 235-36.
227. The participation rates of women over age 20 rose from 33.3% in 1950 to 37.6% in 1960
and then from 43.3% in 1970 to 51.3% in 1980. This participation rate continued to steadily
increase through the 1980s. In 1988 the participation rate was 56.8%, in 1989 it was 57.7%, in
1990 it was 57.9%, and in 1991 the participation rate was 57.8%. See BROOKSI-RE ET AL., supra
note 92, § 7.2, at 42; see also WORKING WOMEN CHARTROOK, supra note 8, at 21-22. Increases in
the women's to men's earnings ratio have occurred across all age groups but have been the
greatest for younger women. For example, in 1979, the ratio among 16- to 20-year-old women
was 79%; by 1990, it had risen to 90%. For 25- to 34-year-old women, median earnings rose
from 67% of men's to 79%. See id.
228. See Imwinkelried, supra note 221, at 885.
229. See id.
230. See Gold, Rule 403, supra note 218, at 506.
231. See People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33, 33 (Cal. 1968) (stating that mathematics is "a verita-
ble sorcerer in our computerized society" and can "cast a spell" over the trier of fact); see also
Victor J. Gold, Limiting Judicial Discretion to Exclude Prejudicial Evidence, 18 U.C. DAVIs. L.
REv. 59, 69 (1984) [hereinafter Gold, Judicial Discretion].
Decision makers are influenced by expert testimony. For example, "[Specific findings from
a mock jury study] are consistent with [other] findings and provide evidence that jurors can be
strongly influenced by specified requests for damages." Allan Raitz et al., Determining Dam-
ages: The Influence of Expert Testimony on Jurors' Decision Making, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
385, 386-95 (1990). Interestingly, the authors of the study found that "the most frequently oc-
curring award for damages was the precise amount suggested by the plaintiff's expert, and the
next most frequent award was the amount cited by the defense." Id.; cf. Terry Lloyd, Effectively
Communicating Numbers in Dispute Settings, in CORPORATE LAW (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice
Course Handbook Series No. 901, 1995) ("Unfortunately, jurors will sometimes feel over-
whelmed [by numbers] and base decisions on emotions such as "gut feelings" or intuition and




parent that a jury may give too much weight to the expert's calcula-
tion, the judge should exclude the evidence.
232
A judge may consider the length of the chain of inference in de-
ciding whether to admit the evidence.2 33 The use of gender-neutral
averages results in less inferential steps than are necessary when using
gender-specific averages. When using tables, one is necessarily con-
cluding that each of the factors used to create those statistics (female
wage rate, furlough to rear children, marriage contingency, lower par-
ticipation rates, etc.) is true of the plaintiff in that case. The use of
gender-specific data necessitates inferring that the plaintiff would
have only earned the national average wage earnings of women in
past years. Moreover, the use of gender-specific tables is based on the
assumption that a female does not have the capacity to earn a rate of
pay equal to that of a male. A statistical average for college gradu-
ates, for example, as a group, and not divided by sex, would impose
only one inferential step: that the plaintiff would have fallen some-
where around the average for that educational group and would have
been active in the work force for about the same number of years as
the average college graduate. Thus, it is more fair to individual female
plaintiffs to use data based on statistical averages for an entire educa-
tional group, not differentiated by sex.2
34
Finally, a judge may consider the correlation between the reason-
able inference drawn from the evidence and the fact the evidence is
intended to prove.235 Inferring that the data in the tables is applicable
to the plaintiff, both presently and in the future, is improper. A mere
hundred years ago, women were barred from most schools of higher
education, and less than twenty years ago most married women did
not work outside the home.2 36 Today, the gap between labor force
participation rates for adult men and women has narrowed2 37 and
232. See FED. R. EvrD. 403.
233. See Imwinkelried, supra note 221, at 885.
234. See Brilmayer et al., supra note 68, at 234 (Brilmayer argues that because sex is immuta-
ble, irrelevant to distinguishing between otherwise identical individuals, and historically abused
as a classifier, any use of sex to predict employment-related traits should be forbidden. When-
ever race or sex is used as a predictor, some individuals are disadvantaged because of a stereo-
type that is true of others, but not of themselves); see also Marshall & Paulin, supra note 70, at 44
(stating that education has a "strong positive effect" on the income of both males and females).
235. See Imwinkelried, supra note 221, at 885.
236. See generally WORKING WOMEN CHARTBOOK, supra note 8.
237. See PETER J. SEPELLI & THOMAS J. PALUMBO, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT
POPULATION REPORTS, P23-189, LABOR FORCE AND OCCUPATION 38 (1995) [hereinafter LABOR
FORCE]; WoJUuNo WOMEN CHARTBOOK, supra note 8, at 3-4. During the 1980s, the number of
women in the labor force increased about 1.2 million a year, on average, as the post-World War
II baby-boom generation completed its entry into the labor force. See id. at 3. In 1950, approxi-
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there is no statistical difference in the proportions of men and women
twenty-five- to twenty-nine-years-old with four or more years of col-
lege.238 Because the tables which are used for damage calculation are
outdated, the assumption that a female litigant's future earning poten-
tial is the same as the income indicated in the gender-specific tables, is
weak. Thus, gender-based tables may misinform the jury as to the
true earning capacity of the female plaintiff.
2. Identifying the Countervailing Probative Dangers
A judge, in determining the admissibility of expert testimony on
damages, may also consider the prejudiciality of the testimony or evi-
dence offered, and its resultant impact on the jury.239 The advisory
committee's note to Rule 403 defines unfair prejudice as "an undue
tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis. '240 The Rule gives
the judge control of what information reaches the factfinder, usually
the jury, so that the probability of an objectively correct factual deter-
mination is maximized.2 41 The Rule recognizes that judges must ac-
count for the inevitable biases of jurors against classes of people,242 in
addition to considering the bias inherent in the proffered evidence.
Not only does Rule 403 guard against misdecision by the trier of fact,
it also promotes the institutional goal of fairness in the judicial
process.2 43
mately 30% of working-age women participated in the labor force. In 1990, this figure nearly
doubled to 57%. This increase offset the long-term decline in the labor force participation rates
of men. In 1950, 82% of working-age men participated in the work force. In 1990, that percent-
age had decreased to 74%. See id. at 39.
238. Differences in educational attainment between the sexes have historically been attrib-
uted to differences in attainment at the college level. The college completion rates for men and
women ages 25 to 29 were 20.0% for men and 12.9% for women in 1970. Since 1970, however,
the college gains of young adult women have surpassed those of young adult men. By 1993,
there was no significant statistical difference. The rate in 1993 for men was 23.4%; the rate for
women was 23.9%. See id. at 18.
239. See FED. R. EviD. 403.
240. FED. R. EvD. 403 advisory committee's note. Unfair prejudice is the danger created by
evidence having a tendency to promote inferential error. See Gold, Rule 403, supra note 218, at
503, 507. Accuracy is an aspect of fairness. See id. The law contains many rules which, in the
name of fairness, exclude highly probative evidence and thus detract from the goal of accuracy.
However, accuracy likely remains the most important indicator of fairness under Rule 403. See
id. at 507-08.
241. See Dolan, supra note 162, at 226.
242. See id.
243. See id. at 228.
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The typical jury represents majoritarian interests. 244 In applying
Rule 403, the judge can consider the inevitable biases of lay jurors.
245
In considering the bias of the jurors, the court must take into account
that jurors may tend to appraise a woman's future earning value as
less than a man's future earning value. 24 This is true of both men and
women on the jury.24 7 Thus, it is likely that a jury will award less to a
woman for the same injuries as a man working in the same occupa-
tion.248 Taking this into account, it is more equitable to use gender-
neutral data for two reasons: (1) gender-based tables reflect data
which is skewed because of past discrimination against women in the
workplace; and (2) juror biases and stereotypes might impact the
amount awarded. 249 The result is prejudice against the plaintiff on
multiple levels.
If other evidence, which does not have the same prejudicial dan-
gers as the offered evidence, could be used to establish the same fact,
then the marginal probative value of the proffered evidence is slight
or non-existent.250 Therefore, if it is available, gender-neutral data
can better predict lost future earning capacity and is less prejudicial.
244. See Imwinkelried, supra note 221, at 896. A study produced by the Chicago-based De-
fense Research Institute found that 53% of the people with household incomes above $40,000
have been called for jury duty, compared with 45% of those with lesser means. See Lloyd, supra
note 231, at 193 n.9. This is supported by a study of 8,468 jurors surveyed by the National Center
for State Courts. The study found that jurors with full-time jobs which paid more than $25,000 a
year and with at least one year of college comprised about 50% of the jurors nationwide. See id.
245. See Imwinkelried, supra note 221, at 896.
246. Damages awarded to women are consistently lower than those awarded to men in the
same age bracket. See Lisa M. Ruda, Note, Caps on Noneconomic Damages and the Female
Plaintiff. Heeding the Warning Signs, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 197, 231 (1993). The disparity is
greatest when the plaintiffs are between the ages of 50 and 59. See id. In this age bracket, the
average damage award for a man is $423,338, while the average for a woman is $58,074. See id.;
see also supra notes 26-46 and accompanying text.
Lately, more research has focused on gender and other biases that jurors may bring to the
courtroom. However, a University of Chicago jury study from the late 1950s found that in a
wrongful death case for a male decedent, the damages awarded the attractive widow were re-
duced because the jury thought her chances of remarriage were high. In post-verdict interviews,
jurors actually commented that if she failed to remarry, the fault would be hers and not theirs.
See Harry Kalven, Jr., The Jury, the Law and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 Omno ST. L.
J. 158, 169 (1958).
247. See Goodman, supra note 42, at 272.
248. See id
249. In one wrongful death case, jurors reported that because the surviving widow was at-
tractive, she would be likely to remarry soon. See id at 265. The damage award was therefore
discounted on the ground that her future husband would take care of her. See id.
250. See CLEARY, supra note 159, § 185, at 546 n.35.
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3. Striking the Balance Between Probative Value and
Probative Dangers
Case law indicates that Rule 403 allows a judge to consider the
effect of the admission of evidence on extrinsic social policies, in as-
sessing whether to admit or exclude certain evidence.25' Decisions
also suggest that Rule 403 can be used to implement substantive social
policies.252 The proponents of this broad reading of the Rule argue
that the stated purpose for the exclusion of evidence on these grounds
is the pursuit of socially desirable objectives unrelated to the goal of
accurate dispute resolution.253 Case law construing Rule 403 strength-
ens the argument that the term "prejudice" in the Rule empowers the
judge to consider injury or prejudice to extrinsic social policies.
254
The use of gender-specific data tables for determining lost earning ca-
pacity effectively contravenes social policy.
If assessments of a female plaintiff's future earnings are based
upon static assumptions drawn from past employment patterns which
are rapidly changing, damage awards may be unfair not only to the
individual female plaintiff but also to younger women as a class.255
Social policy dictates that women receive the same compensation as
251. See Imwinkelried, supra note 221, at 890 (citing as an example United States Football
League v. National Football League, 634 F. Supp. 1155, 1181 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that
under Rule 403, a judge should consider whether the admission of the evidence will tend to chill
the exercise of First Amendment rights)).
252. See id. at 891; Eichel v. New York Cent. R.R., 375 U.S. 253, 255-56 (1963).
253. See Imwinkelried, supra note 221, at 891; Arthur H. Travers, Jr., An Essay on the Deter-
mination of Relevancy Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 1977 Amiz. ST. L.J. 327, 328-29. The
most powerful support for this construction is a statement in the Advisory Committee's Note on
Rule 403. See Imwinkelried, supra note 221, at 891. The first paragraph of that Note refers to
"[t]he rules which follow this Article .. " Article IV includes Rules 407 through 410. Rule 407
bars evidence of subsequent remedial repairs. Rules 408 and 409 ordinarily preclude the admis-
sion of statements or payments made incident to compromise negotiations. Rule 410 similarly
announces a general prohibition against the introduction of statements made during plea bar-
gaining. As Professor Travers has pointed out, these rules rest primarily on considerations of
extrinsic social policy. Travers, supra, at 329, 334, 356-60. This view suggests that the Commit-
tee's Note seems to permit a judge to factor extrinsic social policies as well as judicial administra-
tion concerns into Rule 403 balancing.
254. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 750 F.2d 1215, 1220 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding that the
judge could not consider the impact that admission of the evidence would have on national
security interests), vacated, 780 F.2d 1102 (4th Cir. 1985); United States Football League, 634 F.
Supp. at 1181 (holding that a judge should consider whether the admission of the evidence will
tend to chill the exercise of First Amendment rights). Rule 501 also provides additional support
to this argument. Rule 501 states that privilege law "shall be governed by the principles of
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason
and experience." FED. R. EviD. 501. "The broad authorization, to create evidentiary doctrines
based on extrinsic social concerns under rule 501 makes it more plausible to construe rule 403 as
permitting a judge to consider similar situations." Imwinkelried, supra note 221, at 891.
255. See KlNri & SMrrH, supra note 26, at ix.
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men if the same or similar work is done.256 This being the case, econ-
omists should not take into account past discrimination in wages when
determining future earnings-earnings which are now subject to legis-
lation prohibiting unequal pay between sexes.
When determining the admissibility of damage calculations based
on gender-specific data, judges should exclude such calculations be-
cause they effectively contravene social policy by perpetuating ine-
quality between the sexes on the basis of income. The judge can strike
a balance by allowing statistical tables to be used; however, they
should not be gender-specific, but rather gender-neutral. This data is
still probative (perhaps even more so), but is not as prejudicial.
B. Expert Testimony
Rule 104(a) allows the trial court to make a preliminary determi-
nation as to the admissibility of expert testimony. 257 However, it is
generally the expert who determines whether the facts are reasonably
relied upon by others in the field. 258 If judges took a more active role
in this determination, sex-specific data tables may not always be found
to be reasonably relied upon.
259
256. See supra note 17.
257. Rule 104(a) provides:
Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the
existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the
court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b). In making its determination it is not
bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges.
FEtD. R. EviD. 104(a). However, the liberal nature of the Rules indicates that courts generally
will resolve all doubts concerning the utility of an expert's testimony in favor of admissibility.
See J. WEINsTEiN 702[02], at 702-14. But see Eymard v. Pan Am. World Airways (In re Air
Crash Disaster), 795 F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir. 1986) (asserting that courts should refrain from
exercising extreme liberality in admitting expert testimony). The rationale for the liberal ap-
proach is that the jury is capable of ignoring unhelpful evidence. See Singer Co. v. E.I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co., 579 F.2d 433,443 (8th Cir. 1978) ("[I]t is now for the jury, with the assistance
of vigorous cross examination, to measure the worth of the opinion."); J. WEINSTEIN, supra, 1
702[02], at 702-14 to -15.
258. See sources cited supra note 208; see also United States v. Sims, 514 F.2d 147 (9th Cir.
1975); cf. Punnett v. Carter, 621 F.2d 578 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v. Genser, 582 F.2d 292
(3d Cir. 1978).
259. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1313, 1325 (E.D.Pa.
1980) (The court noted that the Advisory Committee "plainly contemplated that the trial court,
as part of its admissibility judgment [under Rule 703], would inquire into an expert's reasonable
reliance. Furthermore, because the court under F.R.E. 702 must assess a witness' qualifications
in order to permit his testimony, it follows that when an expert deviates from his area of exper-
tise by basing his opinion upon untrustworthy matters, that assessment must similarly be within
the province of the court."), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig.,




Facts, data, or opinions which are otherwise admissible in evi-
dence, but would be excluded under Rule 403, do not automatically
become admissible if offered solely to form part of the basis of an
expert witness' opinion under Rule 703.260 Rule 703 does not auto-
matically permit an expert to base his opinion upon materials that are
otherwise inadmissible by reason of another rule of evidence, unless
these materials are of the type reasonably relied upon by others in the
field.261 The term "reasonably," found in Rule 703, implies a judicial
determination of trustworthiness. 262 If only routine reliance was in-
tended, the terms "customarily" or "regularly" could have been
used.263 Thus, it is possible that gender-specific data, although regu-
larly relied upon by experts in the field, may not be reasonably relied
upon due to its inherent flaws, such as poor predictability of future
earning trends. 264 By employing an analysis of the probative dangers
of the evidence, a trial judge may conclude that the gender-specific
evidence is no longer "reasonably" relied upon.
265
Statistical data on the success of the women's movement show
that the use of gender-specific data in the context of determining fu-
ture earning capacity is no longer reasonable. 266 Because of the nar-
rowing gap between men and women with regard to participation
260. See GRAHAM, supra note 200, § 703.1, at 114; see also Rule 704(a), which provides in
pertinent part: "[T]estimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided." FED. R. EVD. 704(a). Rule
704 was intended to abolish the common law rule against testimony regarding ultimate issues of
fact. FED. R. Evm. 704 advisory committee's note.
261. FED. R. EVID. 703.
262. See GRArHAM, supra note 200, § 703.1, at 105 n.13; Gong v. Hirsch, M.D., 913 F.2d 1269,
1272-73 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that "[in applying the requirement of Rule 703 that the informa-
tion forming the basis of the expert's opinion be of a type reasonably relied upon by experts,....
the trustworthiness of the underlying data is not irrelevant." Barrel of Fun, Inc. v. State Farm
Fire & Cas. Co., 739 F.2d 1028, 1033 (5th Cir.1984) (internal citations omitted)); Mannino v. Int'l
Mfg. Co., 650 F.2d 846, 849 (6th Cir. 1981) (stating that "Rule 703 is concerned with the trust-
worthiness of the resulting opinion."); Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Canarsie Kiddie Shop, Inc., 559 F.
Supp. 1189, 1205 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (excluding expert opinion based on surveys lacking "sufficient
indicia of trustworthiness" under Rule 703); Zenith Radio Corp., 505 F. Supp. at 1324 ("We see
the 'reasonable reliance' language built into Rule 703 as essentially a shorthand translation of
the hearsay rules' trustworthiness element."); Barrel of Fun, Inc., 739 F.2d at 1033 (excluding
expert testimony based on the results of a voice stress analyzer because there was insufficient
foundation establishing its trustworthiness or its acceptance in the relevant scientific
community).
263. See GRAHAM, supra note 200, § 703.1, at 105 n.13.
264. See supra notes 227 and 237 and accompanying text.
265. See Wheeler Tarpeh-Doe v. United States, 771 F. Supp. 427 (D.D.C. 1991), rev'd on
other grounds, 28 F.3d 120 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Reilly v. United States, 665 F. Supp. 976, 997 (D.R.I.
1987).
266. See sources cited supra note 237.
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rates and income, it is necessary for the trial judge to carefully ex-
amine expert testimony.26
7
A trial court may exclude expert opinion if the assumptions upon
which damages are based are unfounded or refuted by the litera-
ture.268 The assumptions regarding women's earnings have been re-
futed by the numerous empirical studies which show that the disparity
between damage awards for men and women is traceable to past dis-
crimination. 269 The assumption, therefore, that women are going to
continue to earn, in proportion to men, the same amount that they did
as a group in the past is misplaced. Considering also the rising partici-
pation rates of women,270 it is clear that the assumptions upon which
damages are based when relying on gender-specific data are becoming
less sound. The probative value of gender-specific evidence would
have to outweigh its prejudicial effect before an expert witness could
base his opinion on it. Thus, considering that the prejudice of using
gender-specific evidence on future earnings outweighs its probative
value,271 the expert should not be allowed to rely upon sex-specific
data in forming his opinion of the plaintiff's lost earning capacity.
This does not mean, however, that the expert can no longer
render an accurate opinion as to the plaintiff's lost earnings. If partic-
ular facts, data, or opinions are excluded from consideration by the
expert, the expert may still render his opinion when an adequate basis
nevertheless remains. 272 In the context of future earnings, the expert
could still render an opinion by relying on gender-neutral data to form
his opinion.
CONCLUSION
Actuarial tables do not address capacity; they are merely predic-
tions of group income levels.273 Gender-based tables are no longer a
reliable method of assessing women's future earnings. Furthermore,
267. See Almonte v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 787 F.2d 763, 770 (1st Cir. 1986); Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1313, 1333 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (stating that
"it is clear that the court may-indeed must--carefully scrutinize the underlying assumptions,
inferences drawn, and conclusions reached by the experts before reaching a decision on admissi-
bility of the expert's opinion"), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust
Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983); American Universal Ins. Co. v. Falzone, 644 F.2d 65, 67 (1st
Cir. 1981) (stating that the reasonableness requirement of Rule 703 is "a matter requiring the
district court's careful consideration").
268. See Davis, supra note 1, at 279.
269. See supra notes 26-46 and accompanying text.
270. See sources cited supra note 78.
271. See supra notes 221-238 and accompanying text.
272. See GRAHAM, supra note 200, § 703.1, at 645-46.
273. See Gibson, supra note 77, at 208.
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these tables should not be used in order to enable women's earning
capacity to be better reflected in tort judgments.
Given the chance, women are proving themselves capable of
achieving or surpassing male accomplishments. 274 Whether or not the
current gender wage inequalities are addressed so that wages reflect
accomplishment levels instead of gender, women's earning capacity
should be viewed as equivalent to that of men.
The source of gender-based influences on personal injury awards
may lie, at least in part, "outside the court system, in the very struc-
ture and functioning of society, as they are reflected in the minds of
fact finders. '275 Courts may therefore be limited in their capacity to
altogether eliminate the influence of the unfair application of these
factors.276 Nonetheless, to the extent that stereotypes or biases result
in unfair treatment of individual female litigants in civil actions, the
judicial system must attempt to prevent this inequity.
The most desirable nondiscriminatory option is to consider each
person as equivalent to the average, unless evidence is produced
which removes the plaintiff from the normal range.277 In doing so,
courts and economist-statisticians can better accomplish the goals of
the Federal Rules of Evidence: fairness and accuracy.278
Courts have interpreted the Federal Rules of Evidence in such a
manner as to allow experts to testify to virtually anything, provided
the expert claims the facts upon which he or she relies are reasonably
relied upon by others in the field.279 Because juries tend to place a lot
of weight on such testimony, courts must abandon this extreme ap-
proach. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, consistent with this view,
has made its position clear:
[W]e adhere to the deferential standard for review of decisions re-
garding the admission of testimony by experts. Nevertheless, we...
caution that the standard leaves appellate judges with a considera-
ble task. We will turn to that task with a sharp eye, particularly in
those instances, hopefully few, where the record makes it evident
that the decision to receive expert testimony was simply tossed off
274. See id.
275. ILLiNois REPORT, supra note 26, at 178.
276. See id.
277. The Supreme Court of Canada had endorsed this approach with regard to the assess-
ment of contingencies: "A trial judge should consider whether there is any evidence which takes
the deceased's situation outside the 'average'; whether there are any features of which no ac-
count was taken in the actuarial tables, either because the factor is entirely personal to the
individual or, because the 'average is not adapted for the category or class to which the person
belongs."' Lewis v. Todd, 14 C.C.L.T. 294, 313 (1980), cited in Gibson, supra note 77, at 208.
278. See sources cited supra note 218.
279. See Miller, supra note 203, at 1083; see also sources cited supra note 208.
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to the jury under a 'let it all in' philosophy. Our message to our
able trial colleagues: it is time to take hold of expert testimony in
federal trials.280
It is no longer proper for economists to assess future earning capacity
using gender-specific statistical data. It is time the courts took a more
active role in assessing the propriety of expert testimony on this aspect
of damages.
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